In the Wake of Yet Another Hurricane, Puerto Rico Needs Real and Equitable Investment

Five years after wreaked havoc on Puerto Rico, has killed at least four people, caused widespread flooding, and left hundreds of thousands of residents . Maria caused extensive damage to Puerto Rico鈥檚 power grid in 2017 that left many residents without electricity for months. Rebuilding it has been hampered by technical, political, and financial challenges.

Carlos A. Su谩rez Carrasquillo and Fernando Tormos-Aponte are social scientists who study Latin American politics and environmental justice. They explain some of the factors that have hindered efforts to recover from Maria and prepare for subsequent storms on this island with a population of .

Failed Promises From Privatization

Carlos A. Su谩rez Carrasquillo, Associate Instructional Professor, Political Science, Center for Latin American Studies, University of Florida

In less than a century, Puerto Rico鈥檚 electricity system has gone full circle from private provision of electric power to a state-led effort to democratize access to power, and then back to a public-private partnership with a strong ethos. Yet Puerto Ricans still face daily challenges in obtaining affordable and efficient electricity services.

When the island鈥檚 electric power system was created in the late 1800s, private companies initially produced and sold electricity. During the New Deal era in the 1930s, the government took over this role. People came to see electric power as a , that the government would provide, at times by .

In the 1940s, Puerto Rico launched , a rapid industrialization program that sought to attract foreign investments in industries such as textiles and petrochemicals. One important element was reliable and cheap electricity, provided by the state through the Autoridad de Energ铆a El茅ctrica, a public corporation known in English as the . Damage from Hurricane Fiona, which dropped over 30 inches of rain on Puerto Rico, has set back post-Hurricane Maria recovery efforts.

Many interests coalesced around PREPA, including elected officials, labor unions, the , and, most importantly, the Puerto Rican public. Patronage and party politics often influenced the company鈥檚 .

PREPA took on significant debt, often at the request of elected officials. For example, in 2011, then-Speaker of the House Jenniffer Gonz谩lez legislated for the company to obtain a line of credit from the Banco Gubernamental de Fomento in order to .

Gov. Alejandro Garc铆a Padilla and Puerto Rico鈥檚 Financial Oversight and Management Board that subsequent governors have kept in place. This left PREPA with limited resources to prepare for Hurricane Maria or make repairs afterward.

In 2021, Puerto Rico鈥檚 government and the financial control board privatized power delivery on the island. PREPA continued to generate electricity, but , a U.S.鈥揅anadian consortium, received a 15-year contract to .

LUMA is at the center of many controversies. It has resisted recognizing the largest and most powerful union in Puerto Rico as its employees鈥� . Many consumers鈥� monthly electric bills have . LUMA was supposed to upgrade Puerto Rico鈥檚 grid, with billions of dollars in federal support, but . Critics have called the company and .

Labor groups, environmentalists, and academics have offered comprehensive alternatives, such as , a proposal to install distributed solar power across the island to reduce Puerto Rico鈥檚 dependence on fossil fuels and what they see as incompetent private administration.

But the changes needed to address Puerto Rico鈥檚 energy crisis are inherently political. Enacting them will require support from the federal fiscal oversight board and Puerto Rican . I believe the public will have to mobilize and rally to convince authorities that the PREPA of old and LUMA today are antiquated organizations that are unable to meet Puerto Ricans鈥� current needs.

Who Gets Disaster Aid?

Fernando Tormos-Aponte, Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Pittsburgh

Disaster aid has been slow to come to Puerto Rico. Five years after Hurricane Maria, the U.S. government is channeling funds to rebuild and harden the archipelago鈥檚 energy infrastructure. But only a few of the planned multimillion-dollar projects have been even .

In addition to privatization of the power system, residents have also contended with bureaucratic obstacles and the .

after Maria were rough estimates, because the storm was so destructive. The U.S. government ultimately calculated total damage to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin islands at .

Now, Hurricane Fiona has caused further damage, which will require even more significant investments. No government authority has sufficient resources on the ground in Puerto Rico to conduct such an assessment, let alone react swiftly to the disaster. Federal Emergency Management Agency Associate Director Anne Bink describes how experience from Hurricane Maria will shape the response to Hurricane Fiona.

Local elected officials are often eager to claim responsibility for securing funding. However, investments in disaster preparedness, such as improving the electric grid, than recovery funds that are disbursed shortly after a disaster strikes.

I expect that the Biden administration will seek to respond faster and more substantively to Hurricane Fiona than the Trump administration did after Hurricane Maria鈥攂ut not necessarily out of compassion.

Presidents tend to use disaster resources to , , and portray themselves as capable disaster managers. And they typically are more vulnerable .

Maria hit Puerto Rico during Donald Trump鈥檚 first year in office. Puerto Rican voters 鈥攁s a , the archipelago does not cast electoral votes鈥攕o Trump likely did not perceive Puerto Ricans as important to his election. The Trump administration engaged in deliberate efforts to and .

In contrast, Joe Biden for his 2020 presidential victory, and Hurricane Fiona has struck just two months before the 2022 midterm elections. Responding offers Biden an opportunity to prove himself a capable disaster manager and attract votes.

Even if the Biden administration is better organized and more responsive, however, marginalized communities often are hampered by when they try to access government resources.

For example, I have interviewed mayors in Puerto Rico who issued contracts to local providers to address urgent needs after the Federal Emergency Management Agency promised reimbursement. To this day, FEMA has not paid some of these mayors back, and the mayors fear that local vendors will not want to do further business with their governments.

Identifying and applying for U.S. government grants is a complex and tedious process that requires training. Access to that training is uneven, and language barriers often keep communities from seeking grants.

After Hurricane Maria, few Puerto Rican communities had the resources and support needed to cope with these barriers. In my view, governments must prioritize marginalized communities in their response to Hurricane Fiona to avoid reproducing the . Elected officials must demand transparency and accountability from those tasked with distributing aid, while holding themselves to the same standards.

This article was originally published by . It has been published here with permission.

Carlos A. Su谩rez Carrasquillo is an Associate Instructional Professor at the Center for Latin American Studies, Department of Political Science, and Affiliate at the Department of Regional and Urban Planning at the University of Florida. His primary teaching and research interests are in urban politics, gated communities, city marketing/branding, and urban politics in Puerto Rico, the Caribbean, and Latin America.

Fernando Tormos-Aponte is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Pittsburgh and a Kendall Fellow at the Union of Concerned Scientists. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from Purdue University and a BA from the Universidad de Puerto Rico鈥擱铆o Piedras. Dr. Tormos-Aponte specializes in environmental and racial justice, intersectional solidarity, identity politics, social policy, and transnational politics.